Brazil has a very peculiar tax collection power distribution and revenue sharing system, that splits three way the consumption tax, giving taxation powers over goods circulation to the States, over services to the Municipalities and over production to the Union.
The Brazilian State circulation of goods tax, whose regulations require unanimity to incentives and benefits concessions, even though the 27 Brazilian States development state are disparate, generates a “fiscal war” / State competition that costs 30 billion Brazilian Reais (6 billion Swiss Francs) yearly and the attempts at settling State Competition are clearly failing, while Switzerland, which has a similar political organization, seems to have a reasonable and functional system.
This dissertation, requirement for the obtaining the title of Doctor in International Tax law, takes a case study approach to compare these two systems, specifically taxable events, financial transfer mechanisms and their rules to avoid State / Canton tax competition to assess if the Swiss system for tax collection power distribution and revenue sharing is a feasible solution to reduce the adverse effects of State tax competition in Brazil.
