1981 study by Tversky and Kahmneman:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease are proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
• If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
• If program B is adopted, there is a ⅓ probability that 600 people will be saved and ⅔ probability that no people will be saved.
Which program would you choose? When the programs were framed in this way, the researchers found that 72 percent of the respondents chose to save 200 lives rather than risk everyone’s lives. However, they then posed the question to a second group of subjects with a twist and framed the alternatives differently.
• If program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
• If program D is adopted, there is a ⅓ probability that nobody will die, and ⅔ probability the 600 people will die.
In surprisingly stark contrast to programs A and B, 78 percent of the respondents chose D, the riskier alternative, when presented with programs C and D