Introducing Machiavelli

Humans tire even of stability and success, and crave novelty. They have a weakness, almost a flair, for corruption; and by the time it becomes visible, it has already taken hold in defiance of the old laws and measures.

But the basic lesson is that humility and forgiveness are usually unaffordable luxuries in the maintenance of liberty: “you can never hope to make yourself secure except by the exercise of power”.

Religion is another resource for combating corruption and ensuring civic spirit – as much through fear as admiration. Characteristically, Machiavelli discusses how to make use of religious worship and its institutions for this purpose, as did the Romans.

Machiavelli does not argue that Christianity is wrong or untrue. As Isaiah Berlin puts it, “a man must choose … One can save one’s soul, or one can found or maintain or serve a great and glorious state; but not always both at once.”

Machiavelli was adamant that when men’s reputations had been gained not by public service but “by private means, they are very dangerous and extremely harmful.”

So one of Machiavelli’s key proposals for a “perfect republic” – taken from the institutional organisation of the Romans – was a mixed constitution, in which neither wealthy patricians nor the more numerous plebs could entirely dominate.

For apart from just laziness and decadence, the chief danger to republican virtù is when either powerful individuals or small factions follow their own agenda at the expense of the collective public interest. Such corruption is ruinous to liberty, and it was the major concern of Machiavelli and republicans like him.

To protect against such private motivation, Machiavelli endorsed “good laws”, including if necessary the severest penalties, to coerce citizens into preferring the common to the private good. The laws in this case are not about protecting individual rights, but are concerned with maintaining civic duties and punishing private bids for power.

Note that Machiavelli does not say that the end justifies the means, morally or otherwise; only that the end, when it is good, “excuses” the means.

Because “when it is absolutely a question of the safety of one’s country … there must be no consideration of just or unjust, of merciful or cruel, of praiseworthy or disgraceful.