Graham Priest

Logic: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions)

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  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    Sentences may be true, false, both, or neither.
  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    the account of descriptions that I have explained is itself problematic in certain ways. According to this account, if δP is a sentence where δ is a description that does not refer to anything, it is false. But this does not always seem to be right.
  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    To put it tendentiously, there are truths about non-existent objects, after all.
  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    Russell’s paradox. Like the liar paradox, it has a cousin. What about the set of all sets that are members of themselves. Is this a member of itself, or is it not? Well, if it is, it is; and if it is not, it is not. Again, there would seem to be nothing to determine the matter either way.
  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    the thing satisfying such and such a condition, satisfies that very condition. This is often called the Characterization Principle
  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    description is something of the form ixcx, where cx is some condition containing occurrences of x.
  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    descriptions have the form: the thing satisfying such and such a condition.
  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    definite descriptions, or sometimes just descriptions
  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    The sentence nP is true in a situation if the object referred to by n has the property expressed by P in that situation.
  • Jan Nohas quoted2 years ago
    (Compare: Everyone has a mother; it does not follow that there is someone who is the mother of everyone.)
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